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Actual Versus Perceived Performance of Judges
Theodore Eisenberg, Talia Fisher & Issi Rosen-Zvi*
I. INTRODUCTION
Perceptions of judges ought to be based on their performance. Yet,
few studies of the relation between perceived and actual judicial perfor-
mance exist. Those claiming judicial bias should be especially sensitive
to the relation between perception and performance. Judges perceived by
the public or by the legal community as disfavoring a group may be re-
garded as biased, but that perception is unfair if the judges' votes in cases
do not disfavor the group. For example, it may be unfair to accuse an
appellate judge of pro-state bias in criminal cases if the judge votes for
defendants at a higher rate than several other judges on the same court.
This Article addresses whether perception matches reality. Several stud-
ies address perceptions of judges and courts by surveying the public
about its confidence in a particular court.' Our study differs because it
* Theodore Eisenberg is the Henry Allen Mark Professor of Law, Cornell Law School, and Adjunct
Professor of Statistical Sciences, Cornell University; Talia Fisher is a senior lecturer at the Tel Aviv
University Buchmann Faculty of Law; Issi Rosen-Zvi is a senior lecturer at the Tel Aviv University
Buchmann Faculty of Law. We thank Na'ama Schlam and Noam Guttman for their invaluable re-
search assistance and insightful comments, as well as for coordinating the student work in a superb
manner. We are also grateful to Efrat Zilberbush, Na'ama Daniel, Nitzan Ilani, and Gadi Ezra for
their assistance in collecting the data. This Article benefitted from comments at faculty workshops at
Bar Ilan University and Haifa University, and from comments on it at the Fourth Annual
Taubenschlag Lecture at Tel Aviv University Buchmann Faculty of Law. This study was supported
in part by a research grant from Cegla Center for Interdisciplinary Research of the Law at Tel Aviv
University. We also thank Robert B. Diener and David S. Litman, Cornell Law School class of 1982
and founders of the Cornell Law School-Tel Aviv University Exchange Initiative, for their support.
1. See generally LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE POLITICS OF
JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS (2007) (assessing perceptions of U.S. Supreme Court nominees); Charles
M. Cameron & Jee-Kwang Park, How Will They Vote? Predicting the Future Behavior of Supreme
Court Nominees, 1937-2006, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 485 (2009) (using preconfirmation in-
formation to assess justices' political ideology and predict their future behavior on the U.S. Supreme
Court); James L. Gibson, The Legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court in a Polarized Polity, 4 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 507 (2007) (assessing perceptions of the U.S. Supreme Court). Some states
address perceptions of judicial performance by requiring assessments of judges' fairness, tempera-
ment, or similar characteristics. See generally REBECCA M. THOMAS ET AL., NEVADA JUDICIAL
EVALUATION PILOT PROJECT, FINAL REPORT (2009); Judicial Performance Evaluations - Retention,
ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/retention/retent.html (last visited Feb. 29,
2012).
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compares perceptions of individual justices with their actual voting pat-
terns.
Incomplete samples are one source of distorted claims about judi-
cial behavior. Excluding a particular group of outcomes, such as unani-
mous decisions, can lead to questionable results.2 Studies regularly report
that a judge's political affiliation, race, or sex is associated with case out-
comes-results that sometimes raise inferences of bias.3 At the trial-court
level, most studies are limited to available opinions, a known source of
possible distortion.4 These studies also tend to exclude cases that end via
settlement, which is the modal outcome in civil litigation.' Several trial-
court level studies that use complete case samples and find no political or
other effects suggest the importance of complete case samples.6
At the appellate level, samples may exclude screening decisions by
courts with discretionary jurisdiction. Judges' screening decisions in dis-
cretionary cases-the decisions whether to grant full review of cases-
often are not publicly available.7 Yet, these screening decisions can com-
prise the bulk of a judge's work.8 Also, studies may not account for the
2. Kevin R. Tully & E. Phelps Gay, Louisiana Supreme Court Defended: A Rebuttal of the
Louisiana Supreme Court in Question: An Empirical and Statistical Study of the Effects of Cam-
paign Money on the Judicial Function, 69 LA. L. REV. 281, 289 (2009) (criticizing study of individ-
ual justices for excluding all unanimous cases from the data).
3. See generally JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002); CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2006).
4. Denise M. Keele et al., An Analysis of Ideological Effects in Published Versus Unpublished
Judicial Opinions, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 213, 234-36 (2009).
5. See generally Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What Is the Settlement Rate and
Why Should We Care?, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. I11 (2009).
6. See, e.g., Orley Ashenfelter, Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, Politics and the
Judiciary: The Influence ofJudicial Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1995);
Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Judicial Study of Class Action Settlements and Their Fee Awards, 7 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 811 (2010); Laura Beth Nielsen et al., Individual Justice or Collective
Legal Mobilization? Employment Discrimination Litigation in the Post Civil Rights United States, 7
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 175, 188 (2010) (political party of the presiding judge is not associated
with outcomes of employment discrimination litigation); Gregory C. Sisk et al., Charting the Influ-
ences on the Judicial Mind An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1337
(1998).
7. U.S. Supreme Court Justices' votes to review cases are not public except in rare cases where
Justices publicly state their views. A review of the Israel Supreme Court's screening decisions in
discretionary-jurisdiction cases seeking review, from which the relatively few discretionary-
jurisdiction cases reviewed on the merits in our sample were chosen, shows significant differences in
judges' screening behavior. Theodore Eisenberg, Talia Fisher & Issi Rosen-Zvi, Case Selection and
Dissent in Courts of Last Resort: An Empirical Study of the Israel Supreme Court, in EMPIRICAL
STUDIES OF JUDICIAL SYSTEMS (Yun-chien Chang ed. forthcoming 2012).
8. See Eisenberg, Fisher & Rosen-Zvi, supra note 7, at tbl.1-2 (showing less than 15% of
discretionary civil or criminal appeals are granted review by the Israel Supreme Court); The Statis-
tics, 125 HARV. L. REV. 362, 369 (2011) (showing 1.1% of petitions to U.S. Supreme Court are
granted review).
696
Actual Versus Perceived Performance ofJudges
nonrandom aspects of assignment, with variation in outcome demon-
strated when analysts consider the effects of nonrandom assignment.9
Some studies of judiciaries, run at the behest of special interest groups,
seem to have little interest in presenting a balanced picture of judicial
behavior.' 0
Are perceptions of judicial performance accurate if the sample is
complete, no screening of cases is present, random assignment is used,
and an interest group is not trying to shape perceptions? This Article uses
such a sample to compare the actual performance of judges in cases with
perceptions of judicial behavior, as reflected in 2106 responses to a sur-
vey of 166 actors in the Israeli legal community. To gauge actual judicial
performance, we use two full years (2006 and 2007) of criminal cases
decided by the Israeli Supreme Court (ISC). The sample consists of 1410
mandatory-jurisdiction criminal cases and forty-eight discretionary-
jurisdiction criminal cases. We compare justices' actual behavior in
criminal cases to survey respondents' rankings of those justices. The re-
sults suggest little association between the reality of judicial performance
in the mass of cases and perceptions of that performance by the legal
community. Because actual performance in the mass of criminal cases is
not associated with perceived performance, we explore alternative
sources of perceptions: media reports, votes in discretionary-jurisdiction
cases, and differences among surveyed respondent groups.
Although our study is limited to one country, the results suggest
caution in concluding that judges favor one group or the other-one pos-
sible definition of bias. The limited association between perception and
reality suggests that claims of bias should be based on careful analysis of
judges' actual behavior, rather than on either casual observation or only a
few cases.
Part II of this Article provides background information about the Is-
raeli judiciary. Part III presents survey results regarding the Israeli legal
community's perceptions of sixteen ISC justices' tendencies in criminal
cases. The survey asked respondents the degree to which they believe
individual justices are favorable to the state or to defendants. Part IV
compares the survey results with justices' actual voting patterns in crimi-
nal cases. Part V explores the differences between perceptions reported
in Part III and the reality reported in Part IV. Part VI concludes.
9. Christina L. Boyd et al., Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex on Judging, 54 AM. J. POL.
SC. 389, 394 (2010); Matthew Hall, Randomness Reconsidered: Modeling Random Judicial As-
signment in the U.S. Courts ofAppeals, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 574 (2010).
10. Theodore Eisenberg, US. Chamber of Commerce Liability Survey: Inaccurate, Unfair, and
Bad for Business, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 969, 970 (2009).
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II. THE ISRAELI JUDICIARY"
Israel is a unitary state with a single system of traditional courts of
general jurisdiction, as well as other tribunals or authorities with judicial
power that have jurisdiction limited by subject matter or persons cov-
ered. Within the traditional courts, the judiciary law establishes three
levels of courts: the ISC, district courts, and magistrate courts.12 District
courts and magistrate courts are trial courts; the ISC functions as both an
appellate court and as the High Court of Justice (HCJ). In its HCJ capaci-
ty, the ISC operates as a court of first and last instance, primarily in areas
relating to government behavior. Because the ISC's HCJ function is not
as an appellate court, this study excludes those cases. The study does
consider HCJ information relating to workload (in contrast to HCJ out-
comes) because the workload imposed by HCJ cases can affect justices'
assignments to appellate cases.
The basic trial courts are the twenty-nine magistrate courts. Magis-
trate courts serve the locality and district in which they sit, and they gen-
erally have criminal jurisdiction over offenses with a potential punish-
ment of up to seven years of imprisonment. They have civil jurisdiction
in matters involving up to a specified monetary amount-currently 2.5
million shekels (approximately U.S. $690,000)-as well as over the use,
possession, and division of real property. Magistrate courts also serve as
traffic courts, municipal courts, family courts, and small-claims courts. A
single judge usually presides in each case unless the president of the
magistrate court directs a panel of three judges to hear the case.13
District courts have residual jurisdiction in any matter that is not
within the sole jurisdiction of another court. The six district courts sit in
Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Haifa, Beersheva, Nazareth, and Petah-Tikva. The
Petah-Tikva court was added in 2007.14 As courts of first instance, dis-
trict courts exercise jurisdiction over criminal cases punishable by more
than seven years imprisonment. District courts' civil jurisdiction extends
to matters in which more than 2.5 million shekels are in dispute. District
courts also serve as administrative courts and hear cases that deal with,
inter alia, companies and partnerships, arbitrations, prisoners' petitions,
and appeals on tax matters. These courts have appellate jurisdiction over
magistrate court judgments. Generally, a panel is composed of a single
11. The description of the Israeli judiciary is based on the description in Theodore Eisenberg,
Talia Fisher & Issi Rosen-Zvi, Does the Judge Matter? Exploiting Random Assignment on a Court
of Last Resort to Assess Judge and Case Selection Effects, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 246 (2012).
12. See generally Courts Law (Consolidated Version), 5744-1984, 38 LSI 271 (1983-1984)
(Isr.).
13. Id. ch. 2, art. 3.
14. Ordinances of Courts (Establishment of The Central District Court), 2007, KT 6585, 824
(lsr.).
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district court judge, though a panel of three judges hears appeals of mag-
istrate court judgments and cases of first instance when the offense is
punishable by ten or more years of imprisonment. A three-judge panel
also sits when the president or deputy president of the district court so
directs. 15
The ISC has jurisdiction to hear criminal and civil appeals from
judgments of the district courts. Cases that begin in a district court are
appealable, as of right, to the ISC. Other matters, particularly the mass of
cases that begin in the magistrate courts, may be appealed only with the
Court's permission. The ISC's decisions are binding on lower courts, and
Israel adheres to the principle of stare decisis.' 6
The ISC generally sits in panels comprised of three justices. The
president or the deputy president of the Court may expand the size of the
panel to any uneven number of justices, but that happened so rarely dur-
ing the two years examined in this study that it did not require further
consideration. Each panel also has the power to decide to expand its size,
and the Court can also decide to initiate a "further hearing" in which a
panel of five or more justices will rehear a case decided by a smaller ISC
panel. A single justice may hear petitions for injunctions, temporary re-
straining orders, or other interim rulings, as well as for an order nisi, but
a single justice may not refuse to grant an order nisi or make it contin-
gent on only some of its assertions. A single justice may hear appeals
against interim rulings by district courts or against the verdict of a single
district court judge hearing an appeal from a case in a magistrate's
court.1
Courts sitting on appeal, whether district courts or the ISC, are for-
mally authorized to adjudicate issues of both fact and law, but they sel-
dom intervene in factual matters and tend to limit their judgment to ques-
tions of law. 8 The underlying rationale is that on appeal, judges usually
are not directly exposed to witnesses and other types of evidence. This
does not negate the ability of the appellate court to examine whether the
factual basis for the decision of the lower court is anchored on sound ev-
identiary foundations, but the de facto appeal practice is not one of de
novo review.19 Our study focuses primarily on mandatory criminal ap-
peals, which are regulated in a slightly different manner than civil ap-
15. Courts Law (Consolidated Version) ch. 2, art. 2.
16. Basic Law: The Judiciary, 5744-1984, SH No. 1110 p. 78, § 20 (Isr.).
17. Courts Law (Consolidated Version) §§ 26, 30.
18. See CrimA 4297/98 Hershtik v. State of Israel 54(4) PD 673, 682 [2000] (Isr.).
19. See CrimA 125/50 Ya'akobovitch v. Attorney General 6(1) PD 514 [1952] (lsr.).
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peals under Israeli law. We describe only the criminal appeals process
here and refer the reader to our description of civil appeals elsewhere. 2 0
In criminal cases, a verdict issued by the district court sitting in the
first instance can be appealed to the ISC as a matter of right.2 1 A verdict
issued by the magistrate court in the first instance can be appealed to the
district court as a matter of right. In Israel, both prosecution and defense
have symmetrical rights of appeal, as the prosecution is authorized to
appeal a defendant's acquittal.22
When a case is initiated in the magistrate court and appealed to the
district court, both the prosecution and the defense can petition the ISC
for a second appellate review. Unlike the situation in civil cases, interim
trial-court decisions in criminal cases cannot be appealed except under
limited circumstances, such as judicial disqualification.23
The requirements governing discretionary ISC appellate review laid
down in Chenion Haifa v. Matzat Or,24 the most cited precedent in Israeli
case law,2 5 apply to criminal and civil cases. 2 6 Chenion Haifa states that
the ISC should grant discretionary review only when significant legal or
public issues are at stake that transcend the interests of the litigating par-
ties. Such legal or public issues may include, for example, conflicting
rulings by lower courts or matters of constitutional significance. Under
this standard, the result reached by the lower court should not affect the
decision to grant a discretionary appeal. Therefore, according to the
standard of review, a defendant's argument concerning the stigmatizing
effect of conviction 27 or even the severity of punishment are not grounds
for a second appellate review. 28
A single justice usually reviews a request for discretionary appeal,
but a panel of three justices can also review the request. 29 When a three-
justice panel reviews the request, the panel is authorized to treat the re-
20. Theodore Eisenberg, Talia Fisher & Issi Rosen-Zvi, Israel's Supreme Court Appellate
Jurisdiction: An Empirical Study, 96 CORNELL L. REv. 693, 700-04 (2011).
21. See Courts Law (Consolidated Version) § 41(a).
22. Israeli law, which does not differentiate between appeals of acquittals and convictions,
allows the prosecution to appeal a defendant's acquittal.
23. Criminal Procedure Law (Consolidated Version), 5742-1982, 36 LSI 35, §§ 146-47
(1981-1982) (lsr.).
24. CA 103/82 Chenion Haifa v. Matzat Or 36(3) PD 123 [1982] (lsr.).
25. See Eisenberg, Fisher & Rosen-Zvi, supra note 20, at 702 n.48.
26. See DC 4927/92 State of Israel v. Ben Yehuda (unpublished opinion).
27. CrimA 1245/93 Shtarkman v. State of Israel 47(2) PD 177 [1993] (Isr.).
28. DC 3251/91 Yishai v. State of Israel PD 45(5) 441 [1991] (Isr.). Our prior work calls into
question adherence to the Chenion Haifa standards. Eisenberg, Fisher & Rosen-Zvi, supra note 20,
at 720.
29. Criminal Procedure Rules, 5734-1974, § 44(7) (lsr.).
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quest as an actual appeal and can decide the case on its merits.3 0 As dis-
cussed previously, discretionary appeals are usually based on a prelimi-
nary screening by a single justice, a process we explore elsewhere.
III. PERCEPTIONS OF ISC JUSTICES
A. Methodology
We used online survey software to ask members of the Israeli legal
community for their opinions regarding the degree to which individual
justices favored the state or defendants in criminal cases. The objectives
of the survey were (1) to obtain information about legal community
members' perceptions of ISC justices to compare with the justices' actual
behavior, and (2) to investigate a possible correlation between the posi-
tion held by the legal professionals and their perception of the justices'
pro-prosecution or pro-defendant tendencies. The survey had two parts.
The first part asked respondents to rate each justice based on the re-
spondent's view of the justice's pro-prosecution or pro-defendant
tendencies. The second part asked respondents about their position in the
Israeli legal community.
In an initial survey of the Israeli legal community in September and
October 2011 and in a follow-up survey limited to law students in No-
vember 2011,32 recipients were invited to participate through an email
containing a hyperlink to an online survey site. The invitations were sent
to the following: (1) faculty members of all university and college law
schools in Israel; (2) all alumni of Tel Aviv University Law Faculty; (3)
approximately 150 current law students at Tel Aviv University belonging
to the classes of 2012 through 2014, as well as advanced-degree students;
(4) all public defenders in Israel; (5) many prominent law firms operating
in Israel; (6) a select group of prestigious criminal lawyers; and (7) the
Attorney General's office. We lacked direct access to public prosecutors;
therefore, we requested that the Attorney General's office assist us in
internally distributing the survey. It is unclear whether the survey was
distributed, and we suspect that it was not. The few responses we re-
ceived from public prosecutors were probably due to their parallel affilia-
tions (such as Tel Aviv University alumni). We used the online software
to allow a recipient to provide only one response per justice.
30. Criminal Procedure Law (Consolidated Version), 5742-1982, 36 LSI 35, § 205 (1981-
1982) (Isr.).
31. Eisenberg, Fisher & Rosen-Zvi, supra note 7.
32. See discussion infra note 45, which discusses the reason for the follow-up survey. The
November 2011 survey targeted law students enrolled in two classes taught by one of the authors.
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The survey asked respondents to "rank each justice according to
your view of their pro prosecution or pro defendant views" on a five-
level scale, which was coded as follows:
Very pro prosecution: 1
Somewhat pro prosecution: 2
Neither pro prosecution nor pro defendant: 3
Somewhat pro defendant: 4
Very pro defendant: 5
Respondents could also reply that they had "no opinion" about a justice.
The survey included all sixteen justices who served on the ISC during the
years 2006 to 2007.
The second part of the survey asked respondents to self-identify
with one of the following groups (the number of respondents in each
group is included in parentheses): (a) private practitioner with an empha-
sis on civil law (civil attorneys) (23); (b) private practitioner with an em-
phasis on criminal law (criminal attorneys) (16); (c) law professor (23);
(d) state attorney (6); (e) public defender (16); (f) law student (73); and
(g) other (9). For some purposes, we combined the criminal attorneys
and public defenders into a single group labeled "defense lawyers." We
aggregated these groups because they represent criminal defendants and
might be expected to have similar views of justices.
The invitation to participate in the survey described the object of
the research generally to avoid tainting the results. It stated:
We examine empirically who are the more pro-prosecutorial justic-
es and who are the more pro-defendant justices. One of the ques-
tions we would like to explore is whether the common perceptions
of justices among lawyers and legal scholars correspond to the real
attitude of the justices as reflected in the empirical data. For that we
need your assistance.
The results of our earlier work-used in the analysis below-
describe the actual pattern of justices' votes, 3 3 which were not made pub-
licly available until the survey period closed. The survey questionnaire is
contained in Appendix A.
The surveys yielded 2656 responses pertaining to individual justic-
es provided by 166 respondents. We removed the "No opinion" respons-
es from the analysis, resulting in 2106 responses. The "Total" column in
Table 1 shows the responses for each justice less the "No opinion" re-
33. Eisenberg, Fisher & Rosen-Zvi, supra note I1.
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sponses, which ranged from a high of 158 for Justice Barak to a low of
ninety-four for Justice Berliner. The "Total" row in Table I shows the
number of responses from each respondent group without the "No opin-
ion" responses. When appropriate, our analysis accounts for the
nonindependence of observations by the same respondent. Due to the
sampling process, we cannot be sure that the respondents are a random
draw from the Israeli legal community, and our findings are subject to
this limitation. Although we solicited a broad range of respondents, we
could not ensure responses to our invitations.
B. Survey Results
Table 1 and Figures 1 and 2 report the pattern of results by justice
and respondent group. The first row of Table 1 shows the mean respons-
es of the respondent groups for each justice on the five-point scale de-
scribed previously. The second row shows the number of respondents
with respect to that justice. For example, the first two rows of the "Civil
attorneys" column show that civil attorneys had a mean response of 1.91
based on twenty-three respondents with respect to Justice Arbel.
2012] 703
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TABLE 1. PERCEIVED PROPENSITY OF VOTING FOR DEFENDANT OR
STATE, BY JUSTICE AND RESPONDENT GROUP
Justice Civil
attorneys
Arbel 1.91
23
Barak 2.76
21
Beinisch 2.09
22
Berliner 2.00
18
Elon 3.50
16
Fogelman 2.83
18
Grunis 2.53
19
Hayut 2.57
21
Joubran 3.10
20
Kheshin, D. 3.07
14
Levy 2.22
23
Melcer 2.94
16
Naor 2.05
22
Procaccia 2.64
22
Rivlin 2.60
15
Rubinstein 2.95
22
Total 2.57
312
Criminal Law Law
attornevs professors students
1.40
15
2.25
16
1.56
16
2.20
15
3.25
12
2.85
13
2.56
16
2.29
14
2.73
15
2.90
10
1.53
15
3.83
12
1.79
14
2.33
15
3.00
16
3.20
15
2.44
229
1.53
19
2.29
21
1.68
22
2.21
14
3.79
14
2.43
14
2.47
19
2.29
17
2.50
18
2.67
12
3.05
19
3.29
14
2.16
19
2.50
18
2.76
17
2.25
20
2.44
277
2.34
59
3.04
71
2.88
67
3.00
25
3.06
49
3.11
27
2.78
59
2.89
55
3.20
64
2.72
53
2.76
54
2.94
48
2.75
63
3.20
61
3.07
54
2.64
56
2.89
865
Public
defenders
1.63
16
2.63
16
1.88
16
1.15
13
3.57
14
2.46
13
2.79
14
2.73
15
3.00
15
3.38
13
2.00
15
3.31
16
1.81
16
2.20
15
2.58
12
3.19
16
2.51
235
State Other Total
attorneys
2.17 2.25 1.98
6 8 146
3.40 3.13 2.80
5 8 158
2.83 2.57 2.35
6 7 156
2.50 2.80 2.28
4 5 94
3.75 3.40 3.33
4 5 114
3.00 3.00 2.83
5 8 98
2.75 3.00 2.69
4 7 138
3.00 3.00 2.69
5 7 134
2.60 2.71 2.99
5 7 144
3.25 2.75 2.87
4 4 110
2.00 3.00 2.47
6 7 139
3.80 3.67 3.20
5 6 117
2.80 2.71 2.37
5 7 146
3.50 3.13 2.83
4 8 143
4.00 3.13 2.95
4 8 126
3.67 2.50 2.79
6 8 143
3.03 2.91 2.70
78 110 2106
Note: The table shows the results of a survey of the Israeli legal community in the fall of 2011 that
asked about the respondents' perceptions of ISC justices as pro-state or pro-defendant. Responses
were on an ordinal scale of one to five, with one being the most pro-state.
The overall mean of the 2106 responses was 2.70, which is some-
what below the nominally neutral response of three on the survey's five-
point scale. Given that the ISC affirmed over 80% of the mandatory
criminal appeals, 34 it is understandable why the respondents regarded
34. Eisenberg, Fisher & Rosen-Zvi, supra note 11. Affirmance rates of about 80% in mandato-
ry-jurisdiction criminal cases are not unusual. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Reversal,
Dissent, and Variability in State Supreme Courts: The Centrality of Jurisdictional Source, 89 B.U.
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justices as being somewhat favorable to the state. Indeed, only the state
attorneys' responses averaged above three, and their mean of 3.03 barely
exceeds that number.
Figure 1 shows the mean response for each justice, designated by
the filled circles, and the upper and lower 95% confidence intervals, in-
dicated by the lines emanating from the circles. The mean responses are
taken from the justice means in Table 1. The x-axis depicts the justices,
with the justice perceived as most favorable to the state appearing closest
to the origin and the justice perceived as most favorable to defendants
included as the last justice on the x-axis. Thus, Justice Arbel was per-
ceived as most favorable to the state and Justice Elon was perceived as
least favorable. The confidence intervals suggest that statistically signifi-
cant differences exist for several pairs of justices. For example, no over-
lap in confidence intervals exists for Justice Arbel and any justice other
than Justice Berliner. Only two justices have lower 95% confidence in-
tervals that exclude three, but several justices have upper 95% confi-
dence intervals that exclude three. This asymmetry is consistent with the
aggregate mean, which suggests that the respondents view the ISC as
somewhat pro-defendant.
Figure 1. Means and 95% Confidence Intervals of Perceptions of Justices
All Respondents
Note: The figure shows the results of a survey of the Israeli legal community in the fall of 2011 that
asked about the respondents' perceptions of ISC justices as pro-state or pro-defendant. Responses
were on an ordinal scale of one to five, with one being the most pro-state. The y-axis shows the
L. REV. 1451, 1479 tbl.4 (2009) (showing such rates in mandatory-jurisdiction criminal cases re-
solved by U.S. state supreme courts).
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mean response for each justice across all survey respondents. The lines represent the 95% confi-
dence intervals for each justice. The justices are ordered along in x-axis in ascending order of pro-
defendant perception.
Figure 2 shows the mean response for each justice divided into four
subfigures by four respondent groups: law professors, defense lawyers,
state attorneys, and law students. Justices are again arranged on the x-
axis in increasing order of pro-defendant perception based on the mean
score across all respondents, which is shown in Figure 1.
Figure 2. Means & 95% Confidence Intervals of Perceptions of Justices
by Group
2A. Defense Lawyers (N=32) 2B. State Attorneys (N=6)
Note: The figure shows the results of a survey of the Israeli legal community in the fall of 2011
asking about the respondents' perceptions of ISC justices as pro-state or pro-defendant. Responses
were on an ordinal scale of one to five, with one being the most pro-state. The y-axis shows the
mean response for each justice across all survey respondents. The lines represent the 95% confi-
dence intervals for each justice. The justices are ordered along the x-axis in ascending order of pro-
defendant perception based on the mean score across all respondents (the same x-axis order as in
Figure 1). Separate figures are shown for different components of the legal community.
Law student perceptions, shown in Figure 2D, tended to cluster
around justices being neutral (a value of three on the perception scale)
between the state and defendants. Table 1 shows law students' mean per-
ception to be 2.89. Moreover, law student perceptions of nearly all the
justices did not vary substantially. With the exception of Justices Arbel
and Rubinstein, law students' perceptions did not significantly differ
from three. If one can assume that students are less informed than more
experienced respondent groups, their responses may reflect a natural ten-
dency to regard justices as neutral with regard to the parties in a case.
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The groups with presumably greater experience and information
about ISC activity perceived the court differently. Table 1 shows that
perceptions of criminal attorneys and public defenders did not substan-
tially differ in their means. Figure 2A combines these two groups as de-
fense lawyers and shows that they perceived a group of five justices
(Arbel, Berliner, Beinisch, Naor, and Levy) as noticeably more pro-state
than the other eleven justices. These five justices had mean perception
scores of less than two. Figure 2A also shows that a group of four justic-
es (Rubinstein, Kheshin, Melcer, and Elon) had mean perception scores
above three, which distinguished them from the remaining seven justices.
Thus, the data demonstrate that defense lawyers divide the justices into
three groups, with five perceived as substantially pro-state, seven per-
ceived as moderately pro-state, and four perceived as moderately pro-
defendant.
Table 1 shows that the mean perception score of law professors was
not materially different from that of defense lawyers. Figure 2C shows
that the law professors' distribution of perception scores shared some
features with defense lawyers' perceptions but noticeably differed in oth-
er respects. The most readily observable common features were the pro-
state perceptions of Justices Arbel and Beinisch and the pro-defendant
perceptions of Justices Melcer and Elon. Law professors also viewed
Justices Berliner and Naor as modestly pro-state, which was not signifi-
cantly different from the view of defense lawyers. One noticeable differ-
ence between law professors and defense lawyers was the perception of
Justice Levy. Whereas defense lawyers perceived him as relatively pro-
state, law professors regarded him as the justice third most favorable to
defendants, as he had a mean perception score above three. Law profes-
sors also regarded Justices Rubinstein and Kheshin as much more pro-
state than defense lawyers did. Compared to Figure l's aggregate pattern,
law professors perceived Justice Joubran as being more pro-state than
other observers did.
The responses from the few responding state attorneys produced
imprecise estimates, as reflected in the wide confidence intervals in Fig-
ure 2B, so comparisons with this group are more tentative. Nevertheless,
a noticeable difference was their generally more pro-defendant percep-
tion of the ISC. Table 1 shows that their mean perception score was 3.03,
which makes them the only group that regarded the justices as pro-
defendant on our scale. Nine justices had mean perception scores of three
or more, so the pro-defendant average of state attorneys was not a conse-
quence of extreme views of one or two justices. Within this generally
more pro-defendant perception, state attorneys shared with defense law-
yers the relative perceptions of Justices Arbel, Berliner, and Levy as be-
2012] 707
Seattle University Law Review
ing pro-state. Thus, the two groups with direct litigation experience-
defense lawyers and state attorneys-while representing clients with op-
posing interests, shared a view of Justice Levy as being relatively pro-
state. Law professors had the opposite perception of him. In contrast, the
state attorneys' perception of Justice Joubran was closer to the perception
of law professors than it was to the perception of defense lawyers. De-
fense lawyers regarded Justice Joubran as relatively pro-defendant,
whereas law professors and state attorneys regarded him as more pro-
state.
A consistent result across all groups was the pro-state perception of
Justice Arbel. She was perceived as the most pro-state justice, or at least
one of the most pro-state justices, by all respondent groups. Justices Elon
and Melcer were consistently regarded as pro-defendant, and a substan-
tial group of justices was perceived as between the two extremes by all
groups.
We used regression models to simultaneously account for the influ-
ences of justices and group membership on survey responses, and to as-
sess the statistical significance of the above descriptive results. Since the
dependent variable was the ordered categorical variable on the five-point
scale, we employed ordered logistic regression. The explanatory varia-
bles consisted of dummy variables for each justice and respondent group.
Table 2 reports the results. Justice Arbel serves as the reference category
for justices, and law professors serve as the reference category for
groups. Since each survey respondent provided multiple responses-a
maximum of one for each of the sixteen justices-standard errors and
significance levels were adjusted to reflect the nonindependence of re-
sponses for individual respondents.
708 [Vol. 35:695
2012] Actual Versus Perceived Performance ofJudges 709
TABLE 2. ORDERED LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODELS OF
PERCEPTIONS OF ISC JUSTICES
Dependent variable, coded on a scale of 1 to 5, is the degree to which a justice is per-
ceived to favor defendants (1 = lowest degree; 5 = highest degree).
(1) (2)
Barak 1.621*** 1.628***
(.187) (.188)
Beinisch .693*** .697***
(.168) (.168)
Berliner .736*** .740***
(.245) (.246)
Elon 2.693*** 2.700***
(.283) (.285)
Fogelman 1.729*** 1.736***
(.190) (.191)
Grunis 1.488*** 1.492***
(.228) (.229)
Hayut 1.465*** 1.470***
(.192) (.192)
Joubran 2.015*** 2.022***
(.242) (.244)
Kheshin 1.807*** 1.814***
(.256) (.256)
Levy .865*** .669***
(.257) (.247)
Melcer 2.394*** 2.402***
(.238) (.240)
Naor .872*** .876***
(.161) (.161)
Procaccia 1.725*** 1.732***
(.196) (.196)
Rivlin 1.946*** 1.953***
(.192) (.193)
Rubinstein 1.617*** 1.625***
(.227) (.228)
Law student .872*** .960***
(.223) (.211)
Other .882*** .970***
(.304) (.295)
Civil lawyer .288 .375
(.269) (.260)
Criminal lawyer .0589 .145
(.269) (.260)
Public defender .168 .252
(.277) (.268)
State attorney 1.191*** 1.279***
(.287) (.278)
Levy x Law professor interaction 2.168**
(1.004)
Observations 2106 2106
Seattle University Law Review
Note: The data are from a survey of the Israeli legal community in the fall of 2011 that asked about
the respondents' perceptions of ISC justices as pro-state or pro-defendant. Responses were on an
ordinal scale of one to five, with one being the most pro-state. Reference category for justices is
Arbel and for groups is law professors. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p <.01, ** p <.05, *
p < .1. Standard errors and significance levels are adjusted to reflect the nonindependence of re-
sponses for individual respondents.
The regression models confirm the pattern in Table 1. The positive-
ly signed coefficients for all justices, as well as their significance levels,
indicate that all justices were perceived to be more pro-defendant than
Justice Arbel, and that those perceptions were statistically significant. If
one uses Justice Rubinstein as a reference, being that he is near the mid-
dle of the justices on the five-point scale, then several other justices were
perceived as significantly different from him. In addition to Justice
Arbel, Justices Beinisch (p = .0001), Berliner (p = .0038), Levy
(p =.013), and Naor (p = .0008) were all perceived as significantly more
pro-state than Justice Rubinstein. Justices Elon (p < .0001) and Melcer
(p = .000 1) were perceived as significantly more pro-defendant than Jus-
tice Rubinstein. Justices Rivlin (p = .08 1) and Joubran (p = .095) were
perceived as more pro-defendant than Justice Rubinstein, though the dif-
ference was marginally significant. That leaves a group of six justices
who join Justice Rubinstein in the data's middle group. The regression
results are also consistent with the perception patterns suggested by Fig-
ure 1.
The models show that law students perceived justices as more like-
ly to be pro-defendant than other groups did (other than the residual
group category of "Other"), and that difference was statistically signifi-
cant. The hypothesis that the coefficient for criminal attorneys equaled
that of state attorneys could be rejected at p = .0001. The hypothesis that
the coefficient for public defenders equaled that of state attorneys could
be rejected at p = .0003. But one cannot reject the hypothesis that crimi-
nal attorneys and public defenders had the same coefficient (p - .67),
35
which supports our decision to sometimes combine those two groups.
Model (2) in Table 2 adds an interaction term equal to the product
of the Levy dummy variable and the law professor dummy variable. It is
positive and statistically significant, confirming Figure 2's indication that
law professors' perception of Justice Levy was significantly more pro-
defendant than the perception of other groups.
We defer possible explanations of the survey results until after we
report the justices' actual votes.
35. Since the data contain only six state-attorney respondents, we also ran the models in Table
3 using a bias-corrected bootstrap sample clustered on respondent with 1000 replications. Results
were not materially different. For a discussion of bootstrap methods, see generally BRADLEY EFRON
& ROBERT 1. TIBSHIRANI, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE BOOTSTRAP (1993).
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IV. ISC JUSTICES' ACTUAL PERFORMANCES COMPARED
TO PERCEPTIONS
To compare perceptions with justices' actual voting behavior, we
used the justices' votes in cases. We used data employed in three earlier
studies of ISC appellate cases, which included discussions of the data's
limitations.3 6 We describe here relevant aspects of the data.
The case outcomes with which we compare perceptions are manda-
tory- and discretionary-jurisdiction criminal cases decided by the ISC in
the years 2006 and 2007. The study includes every ISC substantive opin-
ion available online via the official Israel Judicial Authority (IJA) web-
site for cases decided during that time period. Since the IJA website con-
tains all of the cases decided by the ISC, 37 the resulting database provides
a complete picture of ISC doctrinal decisional activity. We tested the
comprehensiveness and accuracy of the database by comparing it with
data obtained from the ISC's secretariat. This comparison suggested that
the IJA website data are indeed comprehensive, covering the full gamut
of cases.
The cases identified by the above methods were coded by student
research assistants. Prior to the student coding, the authors designed a
data form to structure the coding. After review of the performance of the
form and the students in an initial set of cases, the form was revised and
a final form constructed. The students used that revised form to code the
cases under our supervision.
The outcome variable is each justice's vote in each case. "Vote for
defendant" is a dummy variable recording the direction of each justice's
vote. A justice's vote favored the state if a justice voted to affirm a deci-
sion on an appeal brought by a defendant or reverse a decision on an ap-
peal brought by the state. A vote favored the defendant if it was a vote to
affirm a decision on an appeal brought by the state or to reverse a deci-
sion on an appeal brought by the defendant. A justice's vote could differ
from the case's outcome if a justice dissented, which rarely occurred in
the ISC in the time period studied. We excluded about 4.5% of votes in
mandatory-jurisdiction criminal cases because they involved votes that
we did not characterize as favoring the defendant or the state, such as
"approved in part and denied in part."
36. Eisenberg, Fisher & Rosen-Zvi, supra note 7; Eisenberg, Fisher & Rosen-Zvi, supra note
I1; Eisenberg, Fisher & Rosen-Zvi, supra note 20, at 709.
37. The website does not include cases decided in camera. But since those cases are an insub-
stantial fraction of the cases decided by the Court, the omission does not materially affect the analy-
sis here. See Courts Law (Consolidated Version), 5744-1984, 38 LS1 271, § 70(a) (1983-1984)
(Isr.).
38. Eisenberg, Fisher & Rosen-Zvi, supra note 7.
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Table 3, based on our earlier work,3 9 reports each justice's votes for
mandatory and discretionary cases. It also shows the number of each type
of case (mandatory or discretionary) the justices voted in and each jus-
tice's rank, as measured by the justice's rate of voting for defendants.
The dominant pattern was that the state was more successful than crimi-
nal defendants. 4 0 The lowest rate at which any justice voted in favor of
the state was 72%, as shown in the first numerical column. The range of
pro-defendant vote percentages was broader in discretionary cases, but
these percentages were based on far fewer cases than the mandatory case
percentages. The ISC grants review in a small fraction of discretionary
cases.
TABLE 3. RATE AND RANK OF JUSTICES' VOTING FOR STATE BY
JURISDICTIONAL SOURCE
Mandatory cases
Rate favoring N
defendant
.12 168
.13 167
.13 86
.14 829
.14 142
.15 351
.15 274
.16 446
.16 434
.17 150
.17 195
.19 138
.20 169
.21 215
.23 43
.28 154
Discretionary cases
Rate favoring N
defendant
1.00 4
.80 5
1.00 3
.87 23
.80 5
.82 17
.60 5
.80 20
.85 20
.57 7
.80 5
.85 13
1.00 5
.83 6
1.00 1
.60 5
Justice's
mandatory
case rank
1
2
2
4
4
6
6
8
8
10
10
12
13
14
15
16
Justice's
discretionary
case rank
13
4
13
12
4
8
2
4
10
1
4
10
13
9
13
2
Note: The table shows the rate at which each justice voted for the state's position in mandatory and
discretionary criminal cases. A vote favored the state if it was to affirm an appeal brought by a de-
fendant or to reverse an appeal brought by the state. A vote favored the defendant if it was to affirm
an appeal brought by the state or to reverse an appeal brought by the defendant. The last two col-
umns show the ordinal rank of each justice for mandatory and discretionary cases. The ordinal rank
is based on the rate at which justices voted for the state in criminal cases, with a lower rank corre-
sponding to voting more often for the state. The cases are mandatory- and discretionary-jurisdiction
criminal cases decided by the ISC in the years 2006 and 2007.
39. Eisenberg, Fisher & Rosen-Zvi, supra note I1, at 283 tbl. 18.
40. The state is more successful both in cases appealed by defendants and in cases appealed by
the state. Id
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Regression analysis in our earlier work controlled for nonrandom
aspects of case assignment-case category specialization, workload, and
seniority-as well as for the most serious crime present in a case, and the
gender of defendants. 4 1 It confirmed that Table 3's mandatory case col-
umns provided a reasonable ordering of justices' tendencies to vote for
the state or defendants. By exploiting the use of random case assignment
and controlling for nonrandom aspects of case assignment, the method-
ology accounted for the varying merits of cases presented to justices.
Differences in justices' rates of voting for the two parties are thus rea-
sonably attributable to justices, not to case characteristics. Thus, if one
were to infer bias toward one group or another based on differences in
the rates at which justices voted for the state or for defendants, Table 3's
mandatory case columns show the direction and degree of such bias. Re-
gression analysis in discretionary cases was not feasible because many
justices had few discretionary-jurisdiction cases.
How do the perceptions reported in Part III compare with the jus-
tices' performances as reflected in Table 3? We first compare perfor-
mance in mandatory-jurisdiction cases with survey scores. We then com-
pare performance in discretionary-jurisdiction cases with survey scores.
A. Survey Scores and Mandatory-Jurisdiction Case Performance
Figure 3 shows the relation between survey scores and justices'
votes in mandatory-jurisdiction cases. The data points in Figure 3, indi-
cated by justices' names, represent each justice's rate of voting for de-
fendants, as shown on the x-axis, and that justice's mean survey score, as
shown on the y-axis. For example, Justice Naor voted for defendants in
27.8% of her cases, the highest rate of any justice. Her mean survey
score, as shown in Table 1, was 2.37, well below the overall survey
mean. Her combination of votes and survey scores is therefore represent-
ed by her location in the lower-right portion of Figure 3. If survey per-
ceptions reflected justices' observed rates of voting for defendants, then
the data points should flow from lower left to upper right. That is, a jus-
tice with a relatively high rate of voting for defendants who is also per-
ceived as being relatively pro-defendant should be located in the upper-
right portion of the figure. A justice with a relatively low rate of voting
for defendants who is also perceived as being relatively pro-state should
be located in the lower-left portion of the figure.
41. Id. at 279 tbl.17.
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Figure 3. Relation Between Survey Responses and
Pro-Defendant Vote Rate
Line represents hypothetical assignment of lowest survey score
to lowest pro-defendant vote rate, highest to highest, etc.
Elon
Melcer
-
Rivlidoubran
KhesFogelman Ru stein cia
Gruniklayut
2 Le y
Beinisch Naor
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rq Arbel
.1 .15 .2 .25 .3
Pro-defendant vote rate
Note: The figure shows the relation between survey scores and justices' votes in mandatory-
jurisdiction criminal cases. Survey scores are from the fall 2011 survey of the Israeli legal communi-
ty shown in Table 1, which asked about respondents' perceptions of ISC justices as pro-state or pro-
defendant. Responses were on an ordinal scale of one to five, with one being the most pro-state. The
rates at which justices voted for the state's position in mandatory-jurisdiction criminal cases were
based on cases decided by the ISC in the years 2006 and 2007.
The figure does not show the expected pattern. The flow in the fig-
ure is, if anything, from upper left to lower right. A simple correlation
coefficient was negative but insignificant (-.27; p = .307), suggesting
little association between perceptions and voting patterns. Justices per-
ceived as pro-defendant tended to vote for the state, and a few justices
perceived as pro-state tended to vote for defendants. Justice Naor is a
prime example, as perceptions of her were relatively pro-state, but her
voting pattern was most favorable to defendants. Justices Elon and
Melcer show the opposite combination. They were perceived to be the
most pro-defendant, as shown by their high location on the y-axis, yet
their rates of voting for defendants were relatively low, as shown by their
location toward the left on the x-axis. Justice Fogelman, who had the
most pro-state voting pattern, was perceived to be relatively neutral.
The figure shows that no justice who was perceived as being rela-
tively pro-defendant (Justices Elon, Melcer, Joubran, and Rivlin) actually
tended to vote for defendants. Justices Levy and Berliner were perhaps
the justices with the best match of perceptions of their voting tendency
and their actual voting patterns. They were both perceived as being rela-
tively pro-state, and both voted in favor of the state more than most other
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justices. Conversely, Justice Rivlin was perceived as fourth most favora-
ble to defendants, yet his voting pattern tended to be more pro-state. A
substantial number of justices were perceived as being neither very pro-
state nor very pro-defendant, and their voting patterns reflected that neu-
trality. Justice Arbel's position was distinctive. As Table 1 and Figures 1
and 2 show, she stood out as the justice perceived to be the most pro-
state. Yet, she was in the middle of the justices in terms of the rate at
which she voted for the state.
Figure 3 also contains a line connecting the data points. The points
along the line represent the voting pattern a justice would follow, hypo-
thetically assuming that a justice's rank in voting corresponded with the
associated mean survey score. For example, Justice Arbel had the most
pro-state survey score. If her voting pattern were the most pro-state, she
would be the lowest and farthest left data point, as shown by the first
point on the hypothetical line. In effect, the point on the line combines
the lowest pro-defendant voting rate (which happens to be Justice Fo-
gelman's) with the lowest perception score. The highest and most right-
hand point on the line combines the highest pro-defendant voting rate,
Justice Naor's, with the highest survey score, Justice Elon's. The line
thus reflects perfect correspondence between voting patterns and survey
scores and flows in the expected lower-left to upper-right pattern. It bears
little resemblance to the actual correspondence between voting patterns
and survey scores, shown by the data points labeled with the justices'
names.
We conclude that justices' actual voting patterns in mandatory
criminal cases contribute nothing whatsoever to explaining perceptions
of justices as being pro-state or pro-defendant.
B. Survey Scores and Discretionary-Jurisdiction Case Performance
We noted in a prior study the significantly different voting patterns
of justices in mandatory and discretionary cases. 4 2 Discretionary-
jurisdiction cases, for which basic statistics are reported in Table 3,
therefore provide a second possible basis for explaining the pattern of
survey scores. Figure 4 shows the relation between survey scores and
justices' performance in discretionary-jurisdiction cases. The data points
are again indicated by justices' names, with justices' rates of voting for
defendants (now in discretionary cases) shown on the x-axis and their
mean survey scores shown on the y-axis. The expected pattern of data
flow from lower left to upper right is recognizable, though hardly per-
42. Id. at 283.
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fect. A justice with a relatively high rate of voting for defendants was
generally perceived as being relatively pro-defendant.
Figure 4. Relation Between Survey Responses and Pro-Defendant Vote Rate
Discretionary-Jurisdiction Cases
Elon
Mel er
0
Kheshin, acca
Hayut Grur is
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BeinischJaor
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Arbel
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Pro-defendant vote rate
Note: The figure shows the relation between survey scores and justices' votes in discretionary-
jurisdiction criminal cases. Survey scores are from the fall 2011 survey of the Israeli legal communi-
ty shown in Table 1, which asked about respondents' perceptions of ISC justices as pro-state or pro-
defendant. Responses were on an ordinal scale of one to five, with one being the most pro-state. The
rates at which justices voted for the state's position in discretionary-jurisdiction criminal cases were
based on cases decided by the ISC in the years 2006 and 2007.
A simple correlation coefficient was positive and nearly significant
(.47; p = .065), suggesting a reasonably strong association between per-
ceptions of justices as pro-state or pro-defendant and how justices voted
in discretionary-jurisdiction cases. If one excludes the most outlying
point in the figure, Justice Arbel (discussed below), the coefficient was
.56 and significant at p =.029. However imperfect an association Figure
4 portrays, it is much closer than Figure 3's mandatory case pattern in
exhibiting the expected relation between survey scores and voting pat-
terns.
V. RECONCILING PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY
Part IV's results suggest two differing relations between percep-
tions and reality-a positive association between justices' votes in dis-
cretionary-jurisdiction cases and a negative, insignificant association in
mandatory-jurisdiction cases. This Part explores that difference, as well
as intergroup differences among survey respondents. It also adds a se-
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cond possible source of influence regarding perceptions of justices' per-
formances: coverage in the media.
A. Diferences Based on Jurisdictional Source and Group Affiliation
It is plausible that justices' votes in discretionary cases would better
explain survey scores than votes in mandatory cases. Justices are sup-
posed to grant review in discretionary cases based on each case's im-
portance.43 Though this principle is often not honored,4 if a case's im-
portance plays some role in discretionary case selection, then the average
discretionary case is likely more important than the average mandatory
case. Thus, it is reasonable that a more important class of cases would
play a greater role than mandatory cases in shaping the public's percep-
tions of judicial voting tendencies. Yet, the Court reviews so few discre-
tionary cases compared to mandatory cases-about 3% the number of
mandatory cases-that it is puzzling that discretionary cases influence
the legal community's perception so heavily.
Another factor is likely to help explain the influence of discretion-
ary cases. Attorneys and law students do not read and code all cases
heard by the Court, and are probably unaware of the patterns we report in
mandatory cases. Mandatory cases therefore cannot be a basis for their
perceptions, and discretionary cases may shape perceptions by default.
But even in discretionary cases, the perception and reality for Jus-
tice Arbel do not match. She is perceived as the most pro-state justice,
which is not supported by her voting in either mandatory or discretionary
cases. For many justices, the small number of discretionary cases they
hear makes those cases an imprecise measure of the justices' behavior.
But Justice Arbel has the fourth highest number of discretionary case
participations (seventeen), and Table 3 shows that she ranks as the eighth
most favorable justice for defendants (as well as the sixth most favorable
in mandatory cases). Thus, the legal community's perception of her has
no basis in voting patterns.45 It is possible that one or two major cases are
responsible for shaping public perceptions, and our methodology does
not assign weight to particular cases. In the case of Justice Arbel, another
factor may be at work. She served for several years (1996-2004) as the
43. See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
44. Eisenberg, Fisher & Rosen-Zvi, supra note 20, at 720.
45. We were concerned enough about the reliability of perceptions of her that in the second
survey of a new group of law students, we randomized the order of justices across respondents. Our
concern was that Justice Arbel, based on alphabetization, was otherwise always first, and that the
lowest response of "1" for her was the first response survey respondents encountered (appearing in
the upper-left corner of the online form) and therefore might have an inflated selection rate. Order of
survey questions is known to be important. But the randomized group also ranked Justice Arbel low,
second from bottom, and within .013 of the lowest scoring judge.
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State Attorney of Israel and thus head of the State Attorney Office,
which represents the state in court. Perceptions of Justice Arbel may be
influenced more by her relatively recent association with the state than
by her actual performance in criminal cases.46
Law professors' perceptions of Justice Levy may be better ex-
plained by discretionary-jurisdiction cases than is Justice Arbel's rank-
ing. Table 3 shows that Justice Levy's rank in discretionary cases,
twelfth most favorable to the state, is more pro-defendant than is his rank
in mandatory-jurisdiction cases, which is fourth most favorable to the
state. If law professors' perceptions are shaped predominantly by the se-
lect set of discretionary cases, they may tend to view Justice Levy as
more pro-defendant than other actors.
Some of the perception patterns may be explained not only by the
justices' behavior but also by the survey respondents' characteristics.
Table 1 shows law professors to have a relatively pro-state view of jus-
tices and state attorneys to have a relatively pro-defendant view of justic-
es. In Table 2's regression models, which control for both individual jus-
tices and respondent groups, law professors serve as the reference cate-
gory. The highly statistically significant coefficient for state attorneys
suggests that they tend to rate the justices as more pro-state than law pro-
fessors do. We noted above that state attorneys differ significantly from
both criminal lawyers and from public defenders.
The significant differences between the state attorneys and the de-
fense lawyers, as shown in Table 2, may represent what psychology re-
searchers call "naive realism." 4 7 "[P]eople do not fully appreciate the
subjective status of their own construals, and, as such, they do not make
sufficient allowance for the uncertainties of construal when called on to
make behavioral attributions and predictions about others."48 A similar
46. A similar effect may be at work for Justice Beinisch. She served as the State Attorney of
Israel from 1989 to 1995. Figure 3 indicates that perceptions of her do not match well with the rate at
which she voted for defendants in mandatory-jurisdiction cases. She was the most pro-state justice in
discretionary-jurisdiction cases, but that is based on only seven decisions. The pro-state view of her
may stem from her prior position.
From 1972 to 1979, Justice Naor served as Deputy State Attorney in the Ministry of Justice. She
is also regarded as relatively pro-state. Other justices have also served the government in high legal
offices. Justice Barak served as Israel's Attorney General from 1975 to 1978, and Justice Rubinstein
served as Attorney General from 1997 to 2004. Neither is perceived as very pro-state. There may be
a difference between the way the public perceives former Attorneys General (less pro-state) com-
pared to how the public perceives former state attorneys (more pro-state). Attorneys General have
often publicly defied the government by refusing to represent the state when they thought the state
was in the wrong. State attorneys, on the other hand, are not in a position to defy the state, and they
are in charge of all the criminal trials.
47. Robert J. Robinson et al., Actual Versus Assumed Differences in Construal: "Naive Real-
ism " in Intergroup Perception and Conflict, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 404, 405 (1995).
48. Id. at 404.
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effect has been reported in an experiment that assigns participants roles
as defense lawyers or prosecutors. 49 If lawyers tend to identify with their
clients' positions beyond the objective merits of their cases, then both
state attorneys and defense lawyers may not fully appreciate the subjec-
tive status of their own views in shaping their perceptions of ISC justic-
es. Their inflated perception of the merits of their clients' positions trans-
lates into an altered view of how the justices treat their clients. Defense
lawyers think the justices are more out of line with their clients' inno-
cence or deserved lower sentences, and therefore, they tend to perceive
justices as relatively pro-state. State attorneys think the justices are more
out of line with the state's view of guilt or deserved higher sentences and
therefore tend to perceive justices as relatively pro-defendant. Evidence
exists that lawyers, like other people, also misperceive their own perfor-
mance and behavior.5 0
B. Perceptions and Media Coverage
Perceptions of legal performance can be shaped by media cover-
age,s" so media characterizations of justices may influence perceptions of
them. To explore this influence, we surveyed newspaper coverage of the
sixteen justices appearing in the questionnaire. The newspaper survey
included all articles in two leading Israeli newspapers 5 2-Yediot
Aharonot (Ynet) and Ma'ariv (NRG)-that are available online. These
articles should reasonably reflect media coverage because the vast major-
ity of articles published in the last decade in these central newspapers are
available online. Our sample includes only articles relating to the crimi-
49. ANDREAS GLOCKNER & CHRISTOPH ENGEL, MAX PLANCK INST. FOR RESEARCH ON
COLLECTIVE GOODS, ROLE INDUCED BIAS IN COURT: AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS (2012), availa-
ble at http://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf-dat/2010_37online.pdf.
50. Theodore Eisenberg, Differing Perceptions of Attorney Fees in Bankruptcy Cases, 72
WASH. U. L.Q. 979, 980, 988 (1994) (finding, for example, that 32% of lawyers report that they
never request court-ordered compensation in excess of normal hourly rates, but judges report that
only 11% of lawyers never make such requests); Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to
Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1504 (1998) (noting that "there is suggestive evidence
that self-serving bias does affect lawyers and judges as well as other actors"); George Loewenstein
et al., Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 135, 150
(1993) (finding self-serving interpretation of fairness in study that included law students).
51. E.g., WILLIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL MCCANN, DISTORTING THE LAW: POLITICS, THE
MEDIA, AND THE LITIGATION CRISIS ch. 5 (2004). As claimed by Bogoch and Holzman-Gazit, "Not
only is the media the main source of knowledge about law for the public at large, but it is also an
important resource for legal professionals and members of the political elites as well." Bryna
Bogoch & Yifat Holzman-Gazit, Mutual Bonds: Media Frames and the Israeli High Court ofJus-
tice, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 53, 54 (2008).
52. According to the 2010 TGI Research survey, Yediot Aharonot and Ma'ariv jointly enjoyed
an exposure rate of 47.5% for all individuals above the age of eighteen. The biannual TGI survey
measures newspaper readership among other topics. See Hagai Kraus, TGI Survey: Israel Today
Increases the Gap, WALLA (Jan. 18,2011), http://b.walla.co.il/?w=//l 781680.
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nal case decisions of each of the justices, thereby excluding all references
relating to other judicial activities (especially in the constitutional realm).
In order not to skew the results, we did not double count similar articles
that appeared in both newspapers. The time period included in the online
survey was from 2003 through most of 2011.
Table 4 shows the results of the newspaper survey.5 3 It provides the
percentage of newspaper articles that reported pro-defendant tendencies
out of the total pool of references to each of the justices.
TABLE 4. NEWSPAPER COVERAGE OF ISC JUSTICES' CRIMINAL
DECISIONS, 2003-2011
Number
pro-defendant
2
4
2
12
2
5
3
1
3
3
3
2
Percent
pro-defendant
5.9
20.0
14.3
12.5
66.7
50.0
75.0
22.2
41.6
60.0
6.3
25.0
60.0
16.7
50.0
28.6
In addition to articles about the justices' general criminal case deci-
sions, special attention was focused on the press coverage of the very
high-profile case of former Israel President Moshe Katzav, who was
53. A prior study of media coverage of the ISC during the years 1970-2000, conducted by
Bogoch and Holzman-Gazit, found that during the years 1994-2000, there were forty-two articles
covering criminal appeal cases in Yediot Aharonot. See Bryna Bogoch & Yifat Holzman-Gazit,
Cases in the Media: The Israel Supreme Court in the Print Media, 1970-2000, 46 MEGAMOT 62, 70
(2009). Our survey includes fewer articles because we included only articles relating to specific
justices, as opposed to those covering general case results. As demonstrated in the Bogoch and
Holzman-Gazit study, the ISC enjoys more extensive media coverage in its function as HCJ than as
an appellate court.
Justice
Arbel
Barak
Beinisch
Berliner
Elon
Fogelman
Grunis
Hayut
Joubran
Kheshin, D.
Levy
Melcer
Naor
Procaccia
Rivlin
Rubinstein
Number of
articles
17
5
7
16
6
4
16
9
12
5
16
4
5
18
6
7
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convicted of rape and other charges in December 2010.54 ISC considera-
tion of his appeal began on August 7, 2011, by a three-justice panel con-
sisting of Justices Arbel, Joubran, and Naor. The three justices in the
Katzav case received wide media coverage during the time our survey
was conducted. Discussion in the media about the justices who sat on the
panel began when the panel was selected; thus, much of the coverage
occurred prior to our survey. The defendant's conviction was upheld by
the ISC panel on November 10, 201 1.5 This media coverage included
op-eds and profile articles that depicted both Justices Arbel and Naor as
exhibiting strong pro-state tendencies, while Justice Joubran was overall
portrayed as less pro-state. This may have affected the public perception
with respect to these particular justices.
As with the justices' votes in mandatory and discretionary cases,
the question arises whether survey responses were associated with media
reporting. Figure 5 shows the relation between justices' survey scores
and the percentage of media stories portraying a justice as pro-defendant.
The correlation coefficient was positive and nearly significant (.48;
p = .059), suggesting a reasonable association between media coverage
and perceptions. This result is similar to, but slightly stronger than, the
association between survey scores and discretionary case outcomes. If
one excludes the most outlying justice in the figure, Justice Naor, the
correlation coefficient was .61 and significant at p = .017. So both discre-
tionary case votes and media reports were associated with perceptions of
justices to a much greater degree than mandatory case votes. Discretion-
ary case outcomes and media reports were not linearly correlated (coeffi-
cient = .13; p = .633).
54. Isabel Kershner, Israeli Court Upholds Rape Conviction ofEx-President, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
10, 2011, at A8, available at http://www.nytimes.com/201 1/l l/1 1/world/middleeast/israels-supreme
-court-upholds-rape-conviction-of-ex-president.htmi.
55.1d.
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Figure 5. Relation Between Survey Responses and Media Coverage
Elon
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- Joubran Rivlin
Kheshin, D.
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Note: The figure shows the relation between survey scores and media reporting about ISC justices in
criminal cases. Survey scores are from the fall 2011 survey of the Israeli legal community shown in
Table 1, which asked about respondents' perceptions of ISC justices as pro-state or pro-defendant.
Responses were on an ordinal scale of one to five, with one being the most pro-state. Newspaper
coverage was based on the media results reported in Table 4.
Media coverage is most helpful in explaining perceptions of Justice
Arbel. Her votes in both mandatory- and discretionary-jurisdiction cases
are not consistent with the perception of her as the most pro-state justice.
She was mentioned in more articles than all but one of the justices in our
media survey. Those articles, as shown in Table 4 and in our analysis of
coverage of her participation in the Katzav case, may be the reason for
the pro-state perception. Although Justice Elon was referred to in fewer
articles, the pattern of his media coverage may help explain the percep-
tion of him as pro-defendant despite his voting pattern in mandatory cas-
es, which tended to favor the state.
The precision of the media coverage survey score and discretionary
case survey score relations are subject to the limitation of small numbers
of observations. Table 4 shows few newspaper stories for several justic-
es, and Table 3 shows few discretionary cases for several justices. Never-
theless, the available evidence is that both media coverage and discre-
tionary case voting patterns better explain perceptions of justices than do
voting patterns in the mass of criminal cases, which are reviewed under
mandatory jurisdiction.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Recognizing the gap between perception of judges' voting activity
and how they actually vote is important to fairly evaluate judges. We
have presented evidence that a small number of discretionary cases and
media reports shape perceptions more than the mass of mandatory juris-
diction cases. The perception that a judge is biased toward the state or the
defendant can be inconsistent with the judge's voting pattern in the mass
of cases, as our data show for some ISC justices. As we demonstrated,
Justice Arbel is perceived as the most pro-state justice with no basis for
that perception in her voting record. Justice Naor is perceived as pro-
state but in fact voted for defendants more than any other justice in man-
datory-jurisdiction cases. Justices Elon and Melcer are perceived as pro-
defendant with no basis for that in their voting pattern in mandatory-
jurisdiction cases. Suggestions or innuendo that these justices are biased
in favor of one party or the other in criminal cases might be demonstra-
bly unfair.
Perceptions may be shaped by factors we cannot assess here, such
as the dominance of a few cases that are regarded as important. Such
cases surely influence the public's perceptions. But the full evaluation of
a justice should include their behavior in the mass of cases as well as in
the few. In the non-Israeli context, few studies thoroughly and objective-
ly assess judicial behavior in a manner that would support claims of bias.
Studies tend to lack full samples of judges' cases due to limitations of
available opinions or nonpublic votes to grant review. Our Israel-based
study demonstrates that such limitations can distort perceptions of judi-
cial performance.
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APPENDIX A
1. Please rank each justice according to your view of their pro prosecu-
tion or pro defendant views (note: justices are listed in random order)
Neither pro
Somewhat prosecution Somewhat
Very pro pro nor pro pro Very pro
prosecution prosecution defendant defendant defendant No opinion
Justice Arbel O O O O 0
Neither pro
Somewhat prosecution Somewhat
Very pro pro nor pro pro Very pro
prosecution prosecution defendant defendant defendant No opinion
Justice Barak O 0 O O O O
Neither pro
Somewhat prosecution Somewhat
Very pro pro nor pro pro Very pro
prosecution prosecution defendant defendant defendant No opinion
Justice Beinisch O ) O ) 0
Neither pro
Somewhat prosecution Somewhat
Very pro pro nor pro pro Very pro
prosecution prosecution defendant defendant defendant No opinion
Justice Berliner O O O O O O
Neither pro
Somewhat prosecution Somewhat
Very pro pro nor pro pro Very pro
prosecution prosecution defendant defendant defendant No opinion
Justice Elon (Yosef) 0 ) O O O
Neither pro
Somewhat prosecution Somewhat
Very pro pro nor pro pro Very pro
prosecution prosecution defendant defendant defendant No opinion
Justice Fogelman 1 1 O 0 O 0
Neither pro
Somewhat prosecution Somewhat
Very pro pro norpro pro Very pro
prosecution prosecution defendant defendant defendant No opinion
Justice Grnis 0 0 0 0 O
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Justice Hayut
Justice Joubran
Justice Kheshin, D.
Justice Levy
Justice Melcer
Justice Naor
Justice Procaccia
Justice Rivlin
Justice Rubinstein
Neither pro
Somewhat prosecution
Very pro pro nor pro
prosecution prosecution defendant
Neither pro
Somewhat prosecution
Very pro pro norpro
prosecution prosecution defendant
C) O O
Neither pro
Somewhat prosecution
Very pro pro nor pro
prosecution prosecution defendant
C) O C)
Neither pro
Somewhat prosecution
Very pro pro nor pro
prosecution prosecution defendant
C) O O
Neither pro
Somewhat prosecution
Very pro pro nor pro
prosecution prosecution defendant
C) C)
Neither pro
Somewhat prosecution
Very pro pro nor pro
prosecution prosecution defendant
Neither pro
Somewhat prosecution
Very pro pro nor pro
prosecution prosecution defendant
C) C) C)
Neither pro
Somewhat prosecution
Very pro pro norpro
prosecution prosecution defendant
O C) C)
Neither pro
Somewhat prosecution
Very pro pro norpro
prosecution prosecution defendant
O O O
Somewhat
pro
defendant
C)
Somewhat
pro
defendant
Oa
Somewhat
pro
defendant
Oa
Somewhat
pro
defendant
C)
Somewhat
pro
defendant
O)
Somewhat
pro
defendant
O)
Somewhat
pro
defendant
C)
Somewhat
pro
defendant
O
Somewhat
pro
defendant
O
Very pro
defendant
OQ
Very pro
defendant
Oa
Very pro
defendant
Oa
Very pro
defendant
O)
Very pro
defendant
C)
Very pro
defendant
C)
Very pro
defendant
C)
No opinion
No opinion
C)
725
No opinion
No opinion
C)
No opinion
No
No opinion
(oo
No opinion
No opinion
No opinion
O)
Very pro
defendant
C)
Very pro
defendant
O
726 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 35:695
2. Please selection the response that best describes your law-
related position
0 Private practice, emphasis on civil law
O Private practice, emphasis on criminal law
0 Law professor
O State attorney
O Public defender
O Law student
0 Other
